“New report finds almost no one is punished for the daily threats and deadly attacks faced by journalists in Pakistan.”
Pakistan has seen the deaths of at least 44 journalists as a result of their work in the past decade, and four journalists have been killed so far this year. Pakistan has long been ranked one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, and little is being done to change this. Reporters Without Borders “ranked Pakistan 158th out of 180 countries on its World Press Freedom Index this year - placing it below several countries considered to be active conflict zones, including Afghanistan (128th) and Iraq (153rd).”
Threats to journalists in Pakistan come from all sides–state intelligence agencies, police, military, sectarian groups, and religious extremist groups. The demands of these groups often contradict each other, placing journalists in a difficult situation. Journalists are coerced to shape their reporting based on the demands of these groups at the threat of violence, yet it becomes impossible for journalists to comply with all these demands at once. "Many are stuck in a situation where taking one perspective almost necessarily puts them at risk of incurring the wrath of another actor. So a lot of journalists are stuck in this almost impossible situation where catering to one perpetrator to avoid risk of abuse almost inevitably increases the risk of abuse from another perpetrator."
Threats and acts of violence against journalists go almost entirely unpunished in Pakistan, and there have been just two convictions in the murders of journalists in the past two decades. There is no mechanism or incentive to stop the human rights abuses and intimidation that is going on here, because people are literally getting away with murder. There is almost perfect impunity for crimes against journalists in Pakistan.
Any attempt by news outlets to expose or remedy the attacks on journalists are dealt with harshly, as was the case when a journalist for Geo, a television station, was attacked by gunmen and badly injured. The television station aired reports that accused the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) of the attacks on its journalist. The station received backlash from other news stations, which accused it of producing anti-state propaganda, as well as from the state, which moved to revoke Geo’s broadcasting license as a result of the accusations aired by the station.
As a result of the constant threat of violence against journalists, self-censorship runs rampant in broadcasting agencies “If the state doesn't like you, they eliminate you. If non-state actors don't like you, they just eliminate you."
Source
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
The Balance of Controls and Freedoms in Media
There are many strategies that regimes implement to oppress media freedoms, including threats of violence and imprisonment, state media ownership, bribery, censors, and vague laws interpreted on a case-by-case basis. Since the Arab Spring, many states in the Middle East and North Africa have seen improved freedoms for the media. Before the wave of uprisings, states such as Tunisia and Egypt both had strict laws and practices keeping media under the states’ control.
Tunisian media until 2003 was virtually entirely state-owned; licenses for television and radio stations were cautiously issued to people close to the regime who could be trusted to manage the content of their stations appropriately. In addition to the predominantly state-owned media, no foreign media were allowed into the country, with the exception of one French outlet. The media was tailored to show only positive views of the country and of its leader, essentially making them propaganda factories. Uprisings and other negative events in the country were largely ignored by the media. Social and labor unrest began to be prevalent in the country, at which point Ben Ali began to relax regulations and allow journalists and netizens more freedom. This move was seen as a sign of weakness and Ben Ali was eventually forced to flee the country in early 2011. The new constitution of Tunisia is actually quite progressive by international standards and most media is privatized, diverse and very lightly regulated.
In Mubarak’s Egypt, media freedom was very limited. There was a censor located at each individual media outlet, and owning one’s own newspaper was very difficult. Only people who were relatively close to the regime who could be trusted to manage content were given licenses to own newspapers or broadcast stations. State owned media and media closely controlled by the government covered only stories that would reflect positively on the regime, or at least not negatively. These regulations and censors were generally not very effective in Egypt, however, because the public had good access to international media. Most of the regime’s efforts to control the media fell flat because people were able to access international media as well as utilize social media for organizational purposes. Mubarak, like Ben Ali, was ousted after months of social unrest and demonstrations.
In contrast to these two states whose leaders have been ousted from power after years of oppression and non-existent media freedom, Lebanon is an example of a good balance of control and freedom. There has not been a major uprising in Lebanon in recent years, and the state was largely unaffected by the Arab Spring. Most media in Lebanon is privately owned, and is quite diverse. Media ownership is primarily reserved for powerful businessmen and other elites, but is not controlled for content by the government. There is enough media freedom in Lebanon that journalists and citizens have not been motivated to stage an uprising, yet the government still exercises a certain amount of control over the media. The 1994 Media Law places strict taxes and fees on media outlets, and there is a state agency that censors all incoming foreign media for religious and other controversial content. It is also illegal to slander religion or the president, however most other topics are fairly open. Lebanon has exercised an ample amount of control over its media such that it will be successful in maintaining the status quo, and the president will survive and remain in power.
Tunisian media until 2003 was virtually entirely state-owned; licenses for television and radio stations were cautiously issued to people close to the regime who could be trusted to manage the content of their stations appropriately. In addition to the predominantly state-owned media, no foreign media were allowed into the country, with the exception of one French outlet. The media was tailored to show only positive views of the country and of its leader, essentially making them propaganda factories. Uprisings and other negative events in the country were largely ignored by the media. Social and labor unrest began to be prevalent in the country, at which point Ben Ali began to relax regulations and allow journalists and netizens more freedom. This move was seen as a sign of weakness and Ben Ali was eventually forced to flee the country in early 2011. The new constitution of Tunisia is actually quite progressive by international standards and most media is privatized, diverse and very lightly regulated.
In Mubarak’s Egypt, media freedom was very limited. There was a censor located at each individual media outlet, and owning one’s own newspaper was very difficult. Only people who were relatively close to the regime who could be trusted to manage content were given licenses to own newspapers or broadcast stations. State owned media and media closely controlled by the government covered only stories that would reflect positively on the regime, or at least not negatively. These regulations and censors were generally not very effective in Egypt, however, because the public had good access to international media. Most of the regime’s efforts to control the media fell flat because people were able to access international media as well as utilize social media for organizational purposes. Mubarak, like Ben Ali, was ousted after months of social unrest and demonstrations.
In contrast to these two states whose leaders have been ousted from power after years of oppression and non-existent media freedom, Lebanon is an example of a good balance of control and freedom. There has not been a major uprising in Lebanon in recent years, and the state was largely unaffected by the Arab Spring. Most media in Lebanon is privately owned, and is quite diverse. Media ownership is primarily reserved for powerful businessmen and other elites, but is not controlled for content by the government. There is enough media freedom in Lebanon that journalists and citizens have not been motivated to stage an uprising, yet the government still exercises a certain amount of control over the media. The 1994 Media Law places strict taxes and fees on media outlets, and there is a state agency that censors all incoming foreign media for religious and other controversial content. It is also illegal to slander religion or the president, however most other topics are fairly open. Lebanon has exercised an ample amount of control over its media such that it will be successful in maintaining the status quo, and the president will survive and remain in power.
Sunday, April 13, 2014
Media and Uprsisings in Egypt and Tunisia
Egypt and Tunisia have both undergone uprisings and revolutions in the past several years, leading to significant changes in the way people use, produce, and think about media. Both mass media and social media have changed significantly in Egypt and Tunisia since the beginning of these uprisings.
Egypt
In Egypt, before the revolution and the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011, most newspapers and television stations were state-owned and there were censors located at each individual broadcast station and newspaper office. It was incredibly difficult to own one’s own newspaper due to financial and licensing policies. Although the vast majority of mass media was closely controlled by the government, Egyptians had fairly good access to international media and could rely on these sources for their news, rather than the state-owned Egyptian papers and television stations.
The state-run press in Egypt whole-heartedly supported Mubarak’s regime before and at the beginning of the uprising until it became clear that he may actually be ousted. Media continued to support the regime and provided minimal coverage of demonstrations and protests until it was impossible to ignore. By the day Mubarak stepped down, state television was fully behind the people, praising the revolution.
Until the uprising, people were not reliant on social media for their news because they had access to various international media outlets. Starting in 2008 with the labor strikes in Mahalla, social media was used extensively to discuss issues and to organize demonstrations. In 2010, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page was created in response to the death of a demonstrator at the hands of the police. This page subsequently became a place for Egyptians to congregate and discuss political issues and to organize demonstrations that ultimately led to the ousting of Mubarak in 2011.
After the uprising, there is more freedom of the press in Egypt, however it is a much more dangerous place to be a journalist now that the police state has fallen into a more chaotic one. There are many more privately owned newspapers and broadcast stations than ever before, and these freely discuss political issues. There is limited official censorship, however journalists are still jailed on erroneous charges and certain media companies such as Al Jazeera are subject to great discrimination.
Tunisia
Before the uprising in Tunisia, there were no international media outlets allowed in the country with the exception of one French news agency, and people regarded most mass media as a waste of time because it was so adulterated with propaganda and censorship. Instead of relying on mass media for news, a great many people turned to social media as their primary source of news because the news they found there was not a direct product of propaganda factories or state censors. There was a much greater breadth of news online than in conventional state-owned media, however the quality of the information found on these sources varies a great deal, which is a problem because people tend to be less cautious about the information they are receiving when it is not coming from a state source.
Virtually all media was state owned before the uprising, and the media outlets not officially owned by the state were run by people very close to the regime, such as Ben Ali’s family and close friends, who could be trusted to only broadcast or print things favorable to the regime and to maintain the status quo. In 2003 the regime began to cautiously issue licenses for television stations and newspapers, which appeared to be privatization but was actually just crony capitalism.
In the years leading up to the uprising, the regime figured out what social media was and how it could be used by the people and it tightened its grip on internet censorship significantly. Only China had a more sophisticated internet filtering system than Tunisia. During the uprising, however, Ben Ali lifted internet censorship entirely in an effort to appease the people and to quell the uprising. This move backfired, however, and was seen as a sign of weakness by the people, and the uprising continued.
After the uprising, Tunisia has a constitution that is quite liberal and progressive, even by international standards. There are many diverse and private broadcast stations and newspapers in Tunisia, with light regulation, however many people still prefer social media as their primary source of news. This may be a result of years of habit of distrust in conventional media and total reliance on social media for news.
Egypt
In Egypt, before the revolution and the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011, most newspapers and television stations were state-owned and there were censors located at each individual broadcast station and newspaper office. It was incredibly difficult to own one’s own newspaper due to financial and licensing policies. Although the vast majority of mass media was closely controlled by the government, Egyptians had fairly good access to international media and could rely on these sources for their news, rather than the state-owned Egyptian papers and television stations.
The state-run press in Egypt whole-heartedly supported Mubarak’s regime before and at the beginning of the uprising until it became clear that he may actually be ousted. Media continued to support the regime and provided minimal coverage of demonstrations and protests until it was impossible to ignore. By the day Mubarak stepped down, state television was fully behind the people, praising the revolution.
Until the uprising, people were not reliant on social media for their news because they had access to various international media outlets. Starting in 2008 with the labor strikes in Mahalla, social media was used extensively to discuss issues and to organize demonstrations. In 2010, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page was created in response to the death of a demonstrator at the hands of the police. This page subsequently became a place for Egyptians to congregate and discuss political issues and to organize demonstrations that ultimately led to the ousting of Mubarak in 2011.
After the uprising, there is more freedom of the press in Egypt, however it is a much more dangerous place to be a journalist now that the police state has fallen into a more chaotic one. There are many more privately owned newspapers and broadcast stations than ever before, and these freely discuss political issues. There is limited official censorship, however journalists are still jailed on erroneous charges and certain media companies such as Al Jazeera are subject to great discrimination.
Tunisia
Before the uprising in Tunisia, there were no international media outlets allowed in the country with the exception of one French news agency, and people regarded most mass media as a waste of time because it was so adulterated with propaganda and censorship. Instead of relying on mass media for news, a great many people turned to social media as their primary source of news because the news they found there was not a direct product of propaganda factories or state censors. There was a much greater breadth of news online than in conventional state-owned media, however the quality of the information found on these sources varies a great deal, which is a problem because people tend to be less cautious about the information they are receiving when it is not coming from a state source.
Virtually all media was state owned before the uprising, and the media outlets not officially owned by the state were run by people very close to the regime, such as Ben Ali’s family and close friends, who could be trusted to only broadcast or print things favorable to the regime and to maintain the status quo. In 2003 the regime began to cautiously issue licenses for television stations and newspapers, which appeared to be privatization but was actually just crony capitalism.
In the years leading up to the uprising, the regime figured out what social media was and how it could be used by the people and it tightened its grip on internet censorship significantly. Only China had a more sophisticated internet filtering system than Tunisia. During the uprising, however, Ben Ali lifted internet censorship entirely in an effort to appease the people and to quell the uprising. This move backfired, however, and was seen as a sign of weakness by the people, and the uprising continued.
After the uprising, Tunisia has a constitution that is quite liberal and progressive, even by international standards. There are many diverse and private broadcast stations and newspapers in Tunisia, with light regulation, however many people still prefer social media as their primary source of news. This may be a result of years of habit of distrust in conventional media and total reliance on social media for news.
Thursday, April 3, 2014
USAID Created Cuban Twitter Clone
In 2009, the US government launched its own version of Twitter in Cuba, called ZunZuneo, slang for a hummingbird’s tweet. The project was executed through USAID, which channelled funds for the project through the Cayman Islands and Spain such that the paper trail would not lead back to the US. The details are murky concerning whether or not the project was actually legal under United States law, “which requires written authorization of covert action by the president and congressional notification. Officials at USAID would not say who had approved the program or whether the White House was aware of it.” (source)
The project was born in 2009 when affiliates of the U.S. Agency for International Development covertly gained half a million Cuban cell-phone numbers purportedly through a contact at Cuba’s state-run service provider. USAID began to build a subscriber base through these phone numbers, introducing non-controversial topics to the network such as sports, music, and weather. The plan was to gain a large subscriber base, up to several hundred thousand users, and to introduce political trending topics to the network once ZunZuneo reached critical mass. The subscriber base never reached the height that its designers had hoped it would– there were just 40,000 subscribers at its height.
The ultimate objective of the project was to give Cubans access to a functional social network not controlled by the authoritarian Cuban government, and to provide a mechanism for people to organize political demonstrations at a moment’s notice, and to "renegotiate the balance of power between the state and society." In addition to providing this network for social and political action, USAID stored and analyzed information about subscribers such as age, gender, political tendencies, and receptiveness.
There are several reasons for creating such a network rather than allowing Cubans to simply use Twitter as millions of other people across the world do. First, internet penetration in Cuba was just 15% as of 2012, and the government saw the internet as a dangerous thing that needed to be closely controlled. Also, those people who did have access to Twitter had to pay for it. Twitter in and of itself is a free service, there is no charge to anyone just for using the service. There are other costs incurred by Cubans trying to post tweets, however, because the sparse internet access requires Cubans to use other means of posting to Twitter. The way that many people would post tweets, until recently, was to send an SMS message to a number outside of Cuba, which would then be posted to their Twitter account. The messaging rates associated with these messages were significant– “[every] text message sent costs 1 CUC, something impractical for a country in which the median salary is 17 CUC per month.” (source)
The project ended up being a failure; the network disappeared in 2012 when the grant money ran out, and the subscriber base never reached the numbers that USAID had initially anticipated. This attempt by USAID, whether or not officially authorized by the federal government, is an interesting example of using–or attempting to use–social networks for political transitions. Countries across the Middle East have seen revolutions and transitions toward democracy when people utilize services such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to organize and execute protests and demonstrations to effect change. Although the Middle East is often in the media spotlight as the region most in need of transition to democracy, it is far from being the only region in the world facing similar issues and using similar mechanisms to achieve its goals.
The project was born in 2009 when affiliates of the U.S. Agency for International Development covertly gained half a million Cuban cell-phone numbers purportedly through a contact at Cuba’s state-run service provider. USAID began to build a subscriber base through these phone numbers, introducing non-controversial topics to the network such as sports, music, and weather. The plan was to gain a large subscriber base, up to several hundred thousand users, and to introduce political trending topics to the network once ZunZuneo reached critical mass. The subscriber base never reached the height that its designers had hoped it would– there were just 40,000 subscribers at its height.
The ultimate objective of the project was to give Cubans access to a functional social network not controlled by the authoritarian Cuban government, and to provide a mechanism for people to organize political demonstrations at a moment’s notice, and to "renegotiate the balance of power between the state and society." In addition to providing this network for social and political action, USAID stored and analyzed information about subscribers such as age, gender, political tendencies, and receptiveness.
There are several reasons for creating such a network rather than allowing Cubans to simply use Twitter as millions of other people across the world do. First, internet penetration in Cuba was just 15% as of 2012, and the government saw the internet as a dangerous thing that needed to be closely controlled. Also, those people who did have access to Twitter had to pay for it. Twitter in and of itself is a free service, there is no charge to anyone just for using the service. There are other costs incurred by Cubans trying to post tweets, however, because the sparse internet access requires Cubans to use other means of posting to Twitter. The way that many people would post tweets, until recently, was to send an SMS message to a number outside of Cuba, which would then be posted to their Twitter account. The messaging rates associated with these messages were significant– “[every] text message sent costs 1 CUC, something impractical for a country in which the median salary is 17 CUC per month.” (source)
The project ended up being a failure; the network disappeared in 2012 when the grant money ran out, and the subscriber base never reached the numbers that USAID had initially anticipated. This attempt by USAID, whether or not officially authorized by the federal government, is an interesting example of using–or attempting to use–social networks for political transitions. Countries across the Middle East have seen revolutions and transitions toward democracy when people utilize services such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to organize and execute protests and demonstrations to effect change. Although the Middle East is often in the media spotlight as the region most in need of transition to democracy, it is far from being the only region in the world facing similar issues and using similar mechanisms to achieve its goals.
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